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Abstract 
 
Exacerbated by the specificity of housing as a welfare good, debates on housing, 
citizenship and rights are complex and often confusing. This article attempts to 
clarify the debate on rights-based approaches in the field of housing, shelter and 
homelessness. It focuses on the philosophical distinction between „natural‟ and 
„socially  constructed‟  rights,  and  suggests  that  a  plausible  „third  way‟  may  be 
found by using Martha Nussbaum‟s „central human capabilities‟ approach as a 
foundation for universal human rights. „Citizenship‟ is proposed as a conceptual 
bridge between the philosophical discourse on rights and its practical application 
in  specific political  contexts.  For  this purpose,  T.H.  Marshall‟s  classic  division 
between  „civil‟  and  „social‟  citizenship  rights  is  translated  into  a  distinction 
between „legal‟ and „programmatic‟ rights to housing. The article demonstrates 
that it is possible to object to the notion of natural and/or human rights in the 
housing field, and still be in favour of clearly delimited legal rights to housing for 
homeless people and others in acute need. Conversely, one may be in sympathy 
with the discourse of universal moral rights, but be sceptical about the allegedly 
'atomising' implications of individually enforceable legal rights.  
 
Keywords: right to housing, natural rights, socially constructed rights, legal 
rights, citizenship, capabilities, Nussbaum 
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Rights to Housing: Reviewing the terrain and exploring a way 
forward 
 
Suzanne Fitzpatrick, Bo Bengtsson and Beth Watts 
 
Introduction 
 
This article examines rights-based approaches in the field of housing and shelter. 
Political and normative  issues  about  housing,  dwelling,  shelter,  homelessness 
and  rooflessness  are  often  framed  in  terms  of  rights  and  citizenship.  On  an 
abstract level, questions about „rights to housing‟, and what housing standard 
should  be  entailed  in  being  „a  full  citizen‟,  are  of  relevance  to  our  general 
understanding  of  housing  policy,  nationally  and  internationally.  On  a  more 
concrete  level,  they  are  of  immediate,  and  sometimes  painful,  relevance  to 
individuals and households with scarce economic and social resources, who face 
difficulties  in  finding  adequate  housing  in  the  market,  or  may  even  risk 
homelessness. 
 
Nevertheless, political debates on housing, citizenship and rights are complex 
and often confusing. One reason is that the concepts of „rights‟ and „citizenship‟ 
are  used  with  a  number  of  different  meanings,  often  without  being  explicitly 
defined. This article aims to disentangle this conceptual confusion by exploring 
the philosophical foundations of rights discourses, and their practical application 
to  housing,  shelter  and  homelessness.  In  so  doing,  we  seek  to  provide  an 
overview and critique of rights-based approaches in this field. It should be noted 
that the article's focus is not on „housing rights‟ (i.e. protection from eviction and 
harassment for those who have housing) but rather on the „the right to housing‟ 
(i.e. for those who lack minimally adequate accommodation). 
 
The  article  consists  of  three  main  parts.  The  first  part  is  philosophical  and 
theoretical,  and  takes  as  its  departure  point  some  fundamental  distinctions 
between different types of rights that are of importance to the housing discourse, 
focusing in particular on the difference between understanding rights as „natural‟ 
or  „socially  constructed‟ and  charts  this distinction  in  relation  to  contemporary 
human  rights  discourses.  Martha  Nussbaum‟s  „central  human  capabilities‟ 
approach is put forward as a potential foundation for a universal human rights 
discourse. In order to link these abstract philosophical arguments to the more 
practical political level, we employ the general notion of citizenship, particularly 
as articulated in its classic form by TH Marshall, as a conceptual bridge.  
 
The second part commences the discussion of political discourses on rights and 
shelter by focusing on the national level. We explore varying national policies, 
legislation and institutional arrangements – focusing on the difference between 
„programmatic‟ and  „legally  enforceable‟  rights  –  and analyse  their  merits  and 
demerits,  amongst  other  things  in  relation  to  questions  about  paternalism, 
stigmatisation and empowerment.  3 
 
 
In  the  third  part  we  switch  our  focus  to  the  international  political  realm,  and 
consider the role and function of international declarations and charters about 
rights to housing and shelter. Are they worth more than the paper they are written 
on? Can they have an effect on housing situations globally, or at least in some 
national settings? And should they have such impacts?  
 
Notwithstanding  their  intuitive  appeal,  the  article  seeks  to  emphasise  the 
importance of maintaining a critical perspective on right discourses in the housing 
field, and the premium to be placed on definitional clarity. Specifically, we hope to 
demonstrate that it is possible to object to natural and/or human rights in the 
housing field, and still be in favour of clearly delimited legal rights to housing for 
homeless people and others in acute need. Conversely, one may be in sympathy 
with the discourse of universal moral rights, but be sceptical about the allegedly 
'atomising' implications of individually enforceable legal rights. For those seeking 
to establish a defensible foundation for a „human right‟ to housing, we conclude 
that Nussbaum‟s capabilities approach provides a promising starting point. 
 
The philosophical discourse: rights, capabilities and housing 
 
A key controversy, and source of confusion, in the general rights discourse has 
to do with the origin of rights; whether rights are given by nature, or – somehow – 
socially  constructed.  'Natural  rights'  are  seen  as  inalienable  and  held  by  all 
human  beings  on  the  basis  of  religious  or  other  innate  norms  or  principles. 
'Socially  constructed  rights',  in  contrast,  are  contingent  upon  socially  shared 
norms, customs, or beliefs within a community or culture. How the origin of rights 
is  perceived  also  carries  strong  implications  for  their  application.  If  rights  are 
seen  as  natural,  it  is  nearer  at  hand  to  treat  them  as  universal  and  non-
negotiable than if they are seen as constructed in a certain social context. 
 
The conception of natural or „doctrinal‟ rights as a set of universal, inalienable 
entitlements held by all human beings began to emerge as part of the Western 
„Enlightenment‟  during  the  17
th  and  18
th  centuries,  building  on  the  ideas  of 
philosophers like John Locke (Norman, 1998). Bills of Rights in England (1689), 
America (1789) and France (1789) reflected for the first time an understanding 
that  individuals  were  the  bearers  of  rights.  This  liberal  tradition  conceives  of 
rights as fundamental, bestowed by God, or another divine source, or by some 
understanding  of  the  nature  of  humanity.  Natural  rights  have  largely  been 
concerned with people‟s 'negative' ('freedom') rights rather than 'positive' rights to 
substantive welfare entitlements like housing. 
 
The  jurisprudential  roots  of  natural  rights  are  to  be  found  in  the  natural  law 
tradition which holds that „what naturally is, ought to be‟ (Finch, 1979, p. 29). In 
other words, the „law of nature‟ should be used as a standard against which one 
can measure the validity or rightness of man-made law. Over the centuries, legal 
theorists  have  sought  to  derive  this  „law  of  nature‟  variously  from  „universal 4 
 
nature‟, „divine nature‟ and „human nature‟ itself. According to the accompanying 
deontological (Kantian) style of ethics, an action is deemed morally right or wrong 
on the basis of the natural or „universalisable‟ duties people owe to each other. 
 
The rival jurisprudential tradition of „legal positivism‟ firmly rejects natural law and 
natural rights, and insists instead on a strict separation between the „Is‟ (man-
made,  positive  law)  and  the  „Ought‟  (value  judgements  on  that  law).  Legal 
positivists have highlighted the reactionary implications of the „absolutist‟ natural 
law doctrine, and the way in which its speculative character leaves it open to 
abuse: 
 
... natural law is at the disposal of everyone. The ideology does not exist that 
cannot be defended by an appeal to natural law.  
(Ross, 1974, p. 261).  
 
Natural law and natural rights have thus now largely been discredited as a basis 
for rights discourses (Turner, 1993),  but 'human rights' are often regarded as 
their modern successor. They most often find their expression in international 
agreements and instruments, a number of which refer explicitly to housing, and 
which are discussed in a separate section below. For the moment, the key point 
is  that  human  rights  –  like  natural  rights  –  can  be  understood  as  moral 
statements about human beings, specifying what they ought to have access to. 
But if one dispenses with theological justifications for human rights, then what is 
the foundation of their status?  
 
Turner (1993) has argued that, in the absence of a metaphysical natural law, the 
philosophical foundations of human rights can most effectively be defended via 
an appeal to the universal nature of human 'frailty', particularly the frailty of the 
body. Such a position may quite readily be seen as encompassing a right to at 
least a basic level of shelter consistent with human physiological requirements. In 
a rather more ambitious vein, Norman (1998) argues that a derivative concept of 
rights can be based on the satisfaction of basic and universal human 'needs', as 
there are rational and objective ways of determining what these needs are (see 
also Doyal & Gough, 1991). Housing of a minimally „acceptable‟ standard may be 
viewed  as  intrinsic  to  a  conceptualisation  of  human  rights  derived  from  this 
perspective.    
 
These  sorts  of  arguments  are  thus  not  only  highly  relevant  to  our  concerns 
pertaining to rights to shelter and/or housing, they are also intuitively appealing, 
based as they are on the common sense premise that people have a right to 
what they need – albeit that positivists might argue that they illegitimately derive 
an „Ought‟ from an „Is‟. However, even if it is accepted that the „Is/Ought gap‟ can 
be  bridged  by  statements  about  human  need,  McLachlin  (1998)  gives  good 
reasons for resisting any simple equation of needs and rights: there are many 
things we need but cannot be provided to us as of right. Ignatieff (1984), for 
example, argues that love, belonging, dignity and respect are all things that we 
need which cannot be provided within a framework of rights. 5 
 
 
Another  objection  to  a  needs-based  perspective  has  to  do  with  paternalism. 
Often arguments about human needs to housing and other welfare goods  are 
based on medical, psychological or socio-psychological scientific findings. Since 
such findings, and definitely their policy implications, are invariably contested, 
there is always an element of paternalism in deciding what housing people need, 
at  least  above  an  absolute  minimum  (Bengtsson,  1995,  pp.  132–134).  Such 
approaches  may  be  viewed  as  negating  the  agency  and  dignity  of  homeless 
people and others in housing need, by failing to recognise their capacity to self-
define their own needs.  
 
A  more promising  approach  we  would  argue  is to  be found  in Steven  Lukes' 
(2008) ambitious attempt to defend a „contemporary objective morality‟ in what 
he describes as a 'post-metaphysical world'. He commences this task by posing 
the question:  
 
Can one identify components of wellbeing that are present within any life that 
goes well rather than badly: conditions of human flourishing?  
(Lukes, 2008, p. 129)  
 
His answer is to look to the neo-Aristotelian „capabilities approach‟, pioneered by 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, which focuses on the „substantive freedom‟ 
that people enjoy to achieve „valuable functionings‟ in key aspects of their lives. 
The priority here is on the 'actual opportunities' a person has – what they are 
able  to  be  or  do  –  irrespective  of  whether  they  choose  to  exercise  these 
capabilities.  The  capabilities  perspective  thus  has  the  considerable  merit  of 
minimising accusations of paternalism (cf. Nussbaum 2011b, chap. 5, where she 
discusses  the  relationship  between  culture,  politically-agreed  capabilities,  and 
individual choice).  
 
Sen has, famously, refused to endorse a 'canonical list' of capabilities, citing '... a 
disinclination  to  accept  any  substantive  diminution  of  the  domain  of  public 
reasoning' (2005, p. 157). In his view, the capabilities approach is best viewed as 
an aid to clarification and transparency in public debate because: 
 
... pure theory cannot 'freeze' a list of capabilities for all societies for all time to 
come, irrespective of what citizens come to understand and value. That would be 
not only a denial of the reach of democracy, but also a misunderstanding of what 
pure theory can do, completely divorced from the particular social reality that any 
particular society faces.  
(Sen, 2005, p. 158) 
 
However, Martha Nussbaum (1992, 2000), whom Lukes follows, departs from 
Sen  on  this  point,  developing  a  list  of  ten,  philosophically-derived  central 
capabilities or essential functions that, she argues, all humans value and require 
to  live  a  good  life.  (She  is  therefore  somewhat  less  „constructivist‟  than  Sen, 
although Sen in his writings de facto gives clear indications about where to go: 6 
 
e.g.  health,  education,  political  participation  and  non-discrimination;  cf. 
Nussbaum  2011b,  p.  70.)  Nussbaum‟s  list  includes:  life;  bodily  health;  bodily 
integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; 
other species; play; and control over one‟s environment. According to Nussbaum, 
each  of  these  core  human  capabilities  is  a  separate  component  which  is 
independently important – so a deficit in one cannot be compensated for by a 
surfeit in another - meaning that her framework is 'irreducibly plural'. She also 
emphasises that her list has been drawn up in a deliberately abstract and general 
way, and is not exhaustive, so as to leave room for democratic development and 
local specification in the precise content. This open and pragmatic position lends 
a distinct constructivist touch to her approach.  
 
Several  of  Nussbaum‟s  capabilities  are  highly  relevant  to  housing  and 
homelessness,  most  obviously  bodily  health,  bodily  integrity,  and  control  over 
one‟s  environment.  This  is  convincingly  demonstrated,  for  example,  by 
McNaughton Nicholls (2010) who discussed each of Nussbaum's ten capabilities 
in relation to housing and shelter based on qualitative study of transitions out of 
homelessness. As McNaughton Nicholls (2010, p. 24) comments: „[Capabilities] 
reframes housing as more than a material resource, but as a mechanism that 
can act to enable or constrain the functions required for a "well lived” life.‟ From a 
very  different  perspective,  King  (2003)  similarly  develops  an  account  which 
makes explicit the link between housing and Nussbaum's central capabilities list, 
based  on  the  „situated  nature  of  necessary  human  functioning‟  (p.  669).  He 
argues  that,  in  order  to  undertake  a  range  of  both  basic  and  higher  order 
functions, people must have a place to „be‟, and it would be perverse to argue 
that this place should be other than in housing.  
 
Crucially for our purposes, if these housing-relevant (and other) capabilities are 
accepted as necessary for basic human functioning, this opens up the possibility 
of their becoming politicised as human rights. Nussbaum makes this link via the 
notion that '... the ten central capabilities are fundamental entitlements inherent in 
the very idea of minimum social justice, or a life worthy of human dignity' (p. 25). 
She contends that these central human capabilities and consequent entitlements 
are  „prepolitical,  inherent  in  people's  very  humanity‟  (p.  25),  and  therefore 
independent of membership of any particular political community. 
 
Employing Rawlsian language, Nussbaum claims a high degree of overlapping 
consensus in the cross-cultural norms which underpin her core list of capabilities, 
contending that they derive from:  
 
... an intuitively powerful idea of truly human functioning that has roots in 
many different traditions and is independent of any particular metaphysical or 
religious view.  
(Nussbaum, 2000, p. 101)  
 
Nussbaum's  position  can,  we  would  suggest,  be  characterised  as  a  form  of 
„universal  constructivism‟,  which  offers  a  potential  'third  way'  between 7 
 
(theologically  derived)  natural  rights  and  (culturally  delimited)  social 
constructivism,  by  reference  to  socially  constructed,  but  universally  shared, 
norms. Likewise Sen, even whilst unwilling to commit to a 'fixed forever' list of 
capabilities, seems optimistic that an acceptable specification of capabilities, and 
human rights, will be able to 'survive open critical scrutiny in public reasoning' 
(p.163), commenting that '...the differences on the subject of freedoms and rights 
that  actually  exist  between  societies  [are]  often  much  exaggerated...'  (p.162). 
Lukes (2008) too has attempted to  make the case for universal  moral values 
(distinguishing these from moral norms, which he concedes are more local and 
specific). 
 
The  idea  that  such  a  normative  consensus  exists  at  global  level  remains, 
nonetheless, highly arguable (Finch, 1979; Miller, 1998). However, the absence 
of such an empirical consensus need not be fatal to Nussbaum‟s and Lukes‟ 
theories about universal rights as they could, instead, be viewed as based on a 
sort „moderate essentialism‟, according to which people share an inherent nature 
and a set of functions required for them to flourish, but without presupposing any 
unchanging natural order of things (Sayer, 1997; see also McNaughton Nicholls, 
2010). Such an approach would encompass the 'objectivist' meta-ethical stance 
of Turner (1993) and Norman (1998) above, but would link it substantively to the 
universality of human capabilities requirements rather than to human frailties or 
needs. In this way, a secular 'naturalistic ethics' may also provide a third way 
between  theologically-based  natural  rights  and  entirely  socially  constructed 
rights. Indeed, Nussbaum (1992) herself has made the case for such a 'humanist 
essentialism'.  
 
Citizenship: linking the philosophy and politics of rights to housing 
 
Thus far we have sought to establish that Nussbaum‟s persuasive articulation of 
„moderate essentialism‟ or „universal constructivism‟ may to some extent blur the 
ontological distinction between natural and socially constructed rights, and in so 
doing  can  provide  a  defensible  philosophical  foundation  for  human  rights  to 
substantive goods such as housing. In the following sections, we will take the 
step from this abstract philosophical level to the political level, where normative 
ideas  about  rights  to  housing  and  shelter  are  institutionalised,  formally  and 
informally,  in  specific  jurisdictions.  Regardless  of  whether  rights  on  the 
ontological level are seen as natural, constructed or objectively essential, their 
meaning  and  application  in  a  certain  social  and  political  context  are  always 
socially  constructed.  Ontological  claims  may  be  part  of  that  construction,  but 
there  is  no  pre-determined  way  to  translate  such  claims  to  national  or 
international political discourse or policy.  
 
Instead  we  see  the  classic  Marshallian  concept  of  'social  citizenship'  as  a 
conceptually  useful  bridge  between  these  philosophical  and  political  levels, 
because his attempt to describe the historical development of modern society, 
while not normative in itself, readily lends itself to a normative interpretation, with 8 
 
its  transparent  implication  that  citizens  are  entitled  to  the  array  of  rights  he 
describes.  
 
Marshall  (1949/1964),  who  was  heavily  influenced  by  the  UK  experience  and 
situation  at  the  time,  divided  citizenship  into  three  parts,  each  based  on  a 
particular set of rights. The first part he termed „civil rights‟, i.e.  the „negative 
rights‟ necessary for individual freedom, including the rights to own property and 
to  legal  justice.
  The  second  part  pertained  to  „political  rights‟,  epitomised  by 
democracy.  And  the  third  part  focused  on  „social  rights‟,  covering  'the  whole 
range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to 
share  to  the full  in  the  social  heritage  and  to  live  the  life  of a civilised  being 
according to standards prevailing in the society‟ (Marshall, 1949/1964, pp. 71–
72). 
 
Interestingly,  Marshall  himself  takes  housing  to  illustrate  what  he  views  as  a 
critical conceptual distinction between „civil‟ and „social‟ rights. While civil rights 
are  claims  that  must be met  by  the  state  in  each  individual case,  with  social 
rights:  
 
... the obligation of the State is towards society as a whole, whose remedy in 
case of default lies in parliament or a local council, instead of to individual 
citizens, whose remedy lies in a court of law. 
(Marshall, 1949/1964, pp. 104–105) 
 
Thus  Marshall  distinguishes  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  enforcement  of 
individual citizens‟ „civil‟ rights to own property or to have their tenancy conditions 
respected, and on the other the „social‟ right of the citizenry as a whole to the 
general housing standard members of a society can legitimately expect: „... when 
a slum is being cleared, an old city remodelled, or a new town planned, individual 
claims must be subordinated to the general programme of social advance'. This 
is especially so since housing policy covers the general conditions of the life of a 
whole community (Marshall, 1949/1964, pp. 105–106).  
 
Marshall‟s modern interpreters seldom pay attention to this basic distinction, and 
instead tend to assume that  „social‟ rights constitute substantive entitlements to 
goods or services that ought, like civil rights, be enforceable in law at the behest 
of individuals (e.g. Dean, 2002). However, as we have seen, Marshall himself 
problematises the notion of legal enforceability as intrinsic to the notion of social 
rights in fields such as housing.   
 
In the next section, where we take forward our discussion of the right to housing 
in  national  contexts,  we  will  do  so  within  this  Marshallian  perspective  of 
citizenship,  but  instead  of  adopting  Marshall‟s  potentially  confusing  (and  oft 
misinterpreted) language of civil and social rights, we will use the more modern 
(and transparent) terms of legal vs. programmatic rights. While legal rights are 
enforceable by individual citizens in domestic courts (Fitzpatrick & Watts, 2011), 
a  programmatic  approach  to  rights  to  housing  „binds  the  State  and  public 9 
 
authorities only to the development and implementation of social policies, rather 
than  to  the  legal  protection  of  individuals‟  (Kenna  &  Uhry,  2006,  p.  1).  As 
programmatic rights thus „express goals which political actors … agree to pursue‟ 
(Mabbett, 2005, p. 98), such rights are best viewed as primarily „political markers 
of concern‟ Bengtsson (2001, p. 255). Legal rights, on the other hand, provide an 
explicit 'right of action' for individual citizens. As we shall see below, clarity over 
this  basic  distinction  is  essential  to  the  understanding  of  'rights  talk'  in  the 
housing and homelessness fields at national and international level.  
 
 
The national realm: programmatic rights, legal rights and housing 
 
It is important to begin by acknowledging that programmatic rights to housing, 
though unenforceable by the individual citizen, can find legal  expression, very 
often in constitutional provisions (Fitzpatrick & Stephens, 2007). For example, in 
a number of European countries, including Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Finland and 
Sweden, there is a „right‟ to housing contained in the national constitution, but 
there are seldom legal mechanisms provided to enable homeless individuals to 
enforce these rights: 
 
The constitution [in Sweden] … includes the word „right‟ but this was never 
interpreted to mean that there was an enforceable right to housing for the 
individual citizen.  
(Sahlin, 2005, p. 15)  
 
To legal positivists such „rights‟ are barely worthy of the name, as captured in the 
common law maxim „no right without remedy‟. Their interest would lie solely in 
„black-letter‟ rights, enforceable by individual citizens via the relevant domestic 
court system. Such enforceable rights to accommodation for those who lack it 
are far from common in the housing and homelessness field, and where they do 
exist they are almost always limited to emergency accommodation (Fitzpatrick & 
Stephens, 2007). (It may be worth noting that legally enforceable entitlements 
are in fact also rare in other areas of 'in-kind' welfare, such as education and 
health, but somewhat more common with respect to cash transfers, see Dean, 
2002). 
 
Thus in Germany local authorities have a legally-enforceable obligation (under 
police laws) to accommodate homeless people who would otherwise be roofless, 
and  in  Sweden  likewise  there  is  a  right  to  emergency  shelter  under  social 
services legislation. In Poland, social welfare law obliges local authorities to offer 
help  to  homeless  people,  including  shelter  in  hostels,  refuges  and  other 
institutional settings, and in Hungary social welfare law obliges local authorities to 
provide accommodation in shelters for people whose „physical well-being is at 
risk‟. A single jurisdiction within the US – New York City – provides a legally-
enforceable right to accommodation for the „truly homeless‟ who have absolutely 
nowhere else to go. 
 10 
 
The examples above all refer to temporary shelter in situations of acute distress. 
With respect to enforceable rights to permanent or settled housing for homeless 
people, at present these appear to be limited to the UK and France. The more 
longstanding arrangements in the UK, first established in 1977, are of particular 
interest here (Fitzpatrick et al., 2009). They provide that local authorities must 
ensure that accommodation is made available to certain „priority need‟ categories 
of homeless people, mainly families with children and „vulnerable‟ adults. From 
the outset, the UK courts have held that homeless applicants can challenge local 
authorities‟ decisions under this legislation by way of judicial review, and over the 
past few decades a very substantial body of administrative case law has been 
generated by the statutory homelessness provisions. Homelessness applicants 
are also entitled to an internal review of the decision on their application, with a 
statutory appeal to a relevant court (on a point of law) additionally provided in 
England  and  Wales.  In  Scotland  only,  the  ambitious  target  that  virtually  all 
homeless  people  should  be entitled  to  settled  housing  from the end of  2012, 
achieved via a gradual expansion and then abolition of the priority need status, 
has now been achieved (see further below).  
 
In France, a vociferous protest campaign resulted in emergency legislation being 
passed in 2007 which established a legally-enforceable right to housing (known 
as  the  „DALO‟).  From  2012,  all  social  housing  applicants  who  experience  „an 
abnormally  long  delay‟  in  being  allocated  accommodation  have  been  able  to 
apply to an administrative tribunal to demand that the State provide them with 
housing,  with  certain  „priority‟  categories,  including  homeless  people,  having 
been  able  to  benefit  from  these  rights  from  2008  (Lacharme,  2008).  This 
legislation  was  passed  quickly  in  response  to  media  pressure,  and  there  are 
concerns  that  its  vagueness  in  key  areas,  as  well  as  the  complexities  of  the 
administrative  framework  in  France,  will  frustrate  its  implementation  (Loison-
Leruste & Quilgars, 2009).  
 
To the extent that housing can be defined as a predominantly programmatic right 
in most political communities and as more of a legal right in (a few) others, this 
has a great deal to do with institutional arrangements within the national housing 
regimes, and in particular with the system of housing tenures. For example, a 
relatively large public rental sector with strong municipal control (like in the UK) 
provides a very different context for legal rights to housing than a small social 
sector owned by detached organisations with no, or only arms-length, municipal 
influence (like in Germany). And a public sector with allocations based on needs 
or means testing provides a very different context than a formally 'non-selective' 
system (like in Sweden). What is more, housing regimes and tenure systems are 
generally path dependent and politically and economically difficult to reform in 
response to changing societal conditions (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2010). Thus 
national differences in terms of both legal and programmatic rights to housing 
also tend to be long-lasting.  
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Nonetheless, there are some obvious reasons why enforceable legal rights may 
be preferred to programmatic rights in the housing field. To begin with, those who 
administer welfare goods or services such as housing have power over claimants 
because they have an effective sanction against them (Spicker, 1984), and it can 
be  argued  that  legal  rights-based  approaches  create  a  counter-hierarchy  of 
power by giving service users a „right of action‟ against service providers (Kenna, 
2005). A second and linked argument is that providing welfare goods such as 
housing as a matter of discretion stigmatises recipients, whereas receiving them 
as a matter of right does not. When service users are „beneficiaries‟ rather than 
„rights-holders‟, there is an implied debt of gratitude as the beneficiary is unable 
to honour the powerful norm of reciprocity. As such, the giver gains status, and 
the  receiver  loses  it  (Spicker,  1984).  Approaches  based  on  legal  rights,  it  is 
argued,  may  overcome  this  problem  of  stigmatisation  (Dwyer,  2004),  and 
safeguard  the  self-respect  of  welfare  recipients  (Rawls,  1971),  because  they 
reflect their equal status as a citizen rather than their unequal status as a client 
(Spicker, 1984).  
 
But there are also counter arguments. Enforceable legal rights such as a right to 
housing may be thought to contribute to the „juridification of welfare', such that 
social policy becomes „over-legalised‟, frustrating its fundamental purposes, and 
encouraging  a  defensive,  process-orientated  mindset  on  the  part  of  welfare 
practitioners (Dean, 2002, p. 157). Some authors contend that enforceable legal 
rights  foster  an  adversarial  rather  than  problem-solving  atmosphere  in  public 
services (O‟Sullivan, 2008), and direct power and resources into the hands of the 
legal  profession  and  away  from  service  provision  (see  also  De  Wispelaere  & 
Walsh, 2007). There may also be pragmatic considerations that caution against 
legal rights-based approaches, with Goodin (1986), for example, highlighting the 
costs and practical difficulties faced by service users attempting to realise those 
rights, calling into question the extent to which such rights can in fact empower 
those  with  housing  needs  in  the  context  of  deeply  embedded  hierarchies  of 
power.  
 
From  a  different  angle,  Bengtsson  (2001,  p.  266)  raises  doubts  about  the 
counter-stigmatisation potential of legal rights to housing. Related to Titmuss‟s 
(1958) general distinction between institutional and (more stigmatising) residual 
welfare states, Bengtsson associates a programmatic approach to housing with 
„universalistic‟  systems,  and  a  legalistic  approach  to  more  „selective‟  housing 
regimes, with needs and means testing as part of the allocation procedure. Thus 
stigmatisation  may  be  reinforced  rather  than  diminished  by  enforceable  and 
selective rights to housing. 
 
While  this  conceptual  argument  persuasively  captures  the  sharp  contrast  in 
approach between countries such as the UK and Sweden, it is challenged by the 
empirical  facts  elsewhere.  Many  selective  housing  systems  (e.g.  in  the  US, 
Canada and Australia) do not in fact offer any enforceable legal rights to housing, 
with the notion of social entitlements rather than self-reliance anathema in these 12 
 
contexts.  So  there  is  a  strong  emphasis  on  means  testing  without  legal 
entitlements.  Conversely,  many  countries  (e.g.  in  southern  Europe)  that  offer 
programmatic  rights  (e.g.  constitutional  rights  to  housing)  do  not  have 
universalistic  housing  policies,  but  rather  very  limited  state  intervention  in 
housing.  
 
It remains nonetheless the case that, in those few instances where enforceable 
legal rights are provided, these are inevitably selective in nature. Margaret Levi´s 
(1997) „theory of contingent consent‟, according to which universal systems of 
state intervention are more acceptable to citizens in general than selective ones, 
since they do not draw the same clear line between „us‟ as givers and „them‟ as 
takers, is therefore highly relevant (see also Larsen, 2006). In housing this line 
may  be  particularly  visible,  since  it  is  sometimes  drawn  concretely  and 
conspicuously  between  physical  housing  estates.  Unlike  the  individual-level 
stigmatisation  argument,  Levi‟s  discussion concerns the  legitimacy  of different 
systems at the societal level, and in particular among taxpayers, indicating that 
residual and selective systems tend to be more controversial, and consequently 
smaller  in  scope  and  more  vulnerable  to  budget  cuts,  than  institutional  and 
universal ones.  
 
A recent comparative study by one of the authors sheds empirical light on some 
of these issues, particularly with respect to how they play out at the individual 
level. Comparing the experiences of single homeless men in the (strongly legal 
rights-based)  Scottish  system  with  the  (non  legal  rights-based)  Irish  system, 
Watts  (2013)  argues  that  legal  rights  to  housing  in  Scotland  support 
demonstrably better outcomes for this group in terms of meeting their need for 
settled housing. Moreover, in line with Lewis & Smithson (2001), the research 
further  suggests  that  a  framework  of  legal  rights  has  discursive  and  psycho-
social  impacts,  with  „statutory  rights  …  becom[ing]  internalised  as  a  sense  of 
entitlement‟ (p. 1477) and help to construct the claims of this group as legitimate 
among  those  working  in  the  sector.  Crucially,  these  positive  impacts  do  not 
appear  to  depend  on  the  actual  pursuit  of  legal  challenges  by  individual 
homeless households, but rather on more subtle mechanisms, including the tight 
parameters legal rights cast around the discretion of service providers, and the 
capacity of such enforceable rights to „crowd out‟ competing policy objectives or 
concerns at the „street level‟.  
 
These findings are very much in keeping with broader international evidence that 
suggests that enforceable statutory rights frameworks, such as those pertaining 
in the UK, help to counter the tendency for social landlords to exclude the very 
most  vulnerable,  and  poorest,  households  from  their  properties  (Fitzpatrick  & 
Stephens, 2007; Pleace et al., 2012).  
  
 
The international realm: human rights, international law and housing 
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At the international level, Marshall‟s conception of citizenship is more difficult to 
apply. The reason for this is that national rights, whether legal or programmatic, 
can be related to the jurisdiction of a nation state with its legislative power and, 
ultimately, its Weberian „monopoly on the legitimate use of violence‟. The status 
of international rights is more ambivalent due to the anarchistic character of the 
international community and the lack of an authoritative „state‟ to supervise their 
fulfilment (see further below).  
 
Human  rights  are  most  often  encapsulated  in  international  agreements  and 
instruments, many of which encompass „positive‟ social rights, including rights to 
housing. For example, Article 25 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) asserts: 
 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
wellbeing  of  himself  and  his  family,  including  food,  clothing,  housing  and 
medical care and necessary social services.  
 
While  this  resolution  is  not  formally  binding,  it  is  considered  a  key  part  of 
international  customary  law  and  has  provided  the  principal  foundation  for 
subsequent debate on universal human rights. Other international instruments do 
impose  obligations  on  ratifying  states,  binding  in  international  law,  which  are 
relevant to the right to housing. These include the UN International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and at European level, the Charter 
of  Fundamental  Rights  (European  Union,  2000),  and  the  European  Social 
Charter (Council of Europe, 1961, revised in 1996) (Kenna, 2005). Perhaps of 
greatest  practical  consequence  for  our  present  purposes  is  Article  31  of  the 
Revised European Social Charter (1996). This Article obliges contracting states 
to  take  measures  designed  to  promote  access  to  housing  of  an  adequate 
standard,  to  prevent  and  reduce  homelessness  with  a  view  to  its  gradual 
elimination, and to make housing affordable to all. Crucially, a mechanism for 
„collective complaints‟ was introduced under this Charter, and this has been used 
by FEANTSA (an EC-funded homelessness lobby organisation), for example, to 
establish that France had violated the right to housing for all (Kenna & Uhry, 
2008).  
 
Whatever  their  legal  ramifications,  such  human  rights-based  verdicts  can  be 
viewed,  as  we  have  argued  above,  as  primarily  moral  statements,  bringing 
ethical  pressure  to  bear  on  relevant  states  to  take  measures  to  change  their 
policy and procedures. Such a moral interpretation of human rights accords with 
the  sentiments  of  human  rights  advocates  and  organisations,  who  take  the 
position that the rights specified in these international instruments make „moral 
claims on the behaviour of individual and collective agents, and on the design of 
social arrangements‟ (UNDP, 2000, p. 25). Neglect of the demands they imply 
therefore „involves a serious moral – or political – failure‟ (UNDP, 2000, p. 24).  
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'Human rights-talk‟ thus carries with it considerable ethical and intuitive force, but 
beneath  its  ostensible  appeal  lie  fundamental  conceptual  and  empirical 
questions. As Sen has remarked: 
 
... despite the tremendous appeal of the idea of human rights, it is also seen by 
many  as  being  intellectually  frail  –  lacking  in  foundation  and  perhaps  even  in 
coherence and cogency.  
(Sen, 2005, p. 151)  
 
Three key problems with human rights – and their applicability in the housing and 
homelessness field – are considered here: their contested normative value and 
coherence, their lacking enforceability, and their abstract nature.  
 
First, and most fundamentally, intrinsic to most discourses on human rights is the 
idea that they are self-evident, inalienable, and non-negotiable: „absolute‟ in other 
words. But are the rights declared by the architects of international and European 
human  rights  instruments  –  particularly  material  rights  such  as  the  right  to 
housing – any less politically contested than other claims about how material 
resources should be distributed in society? One could argue that labelling such 
claims as moral „rights‟ is a mere rhetorical device intended to shut down debate 
by investing one‟s own particular political priorities with a „protected‟ status – after 
all, as Dworkin (1977) puts it, „rights are trumps‟. Notwithstanding the emphasis 
placed on 'public discourse' by some rights theorists (for example Sen, 2005), it 
is difficult to escape the sense that some rights enthusiasts are seeking to put 
certain  matters  'beyond'  or  'outside  of'  politics  and,  at  least  in  democratic 
contexts,  such  a  move  requires  robust  normative  justification.  Whether  such 
justification  exists  turns  in  large  part  on  how  convincing  one  finds  the 
foundational discussion above: has Nussbaum (or anyone else) succeeded in 
demonstrating a universal basis for non-negotiable rights? And, if so, can this 
universal  basis  be  consistently  and  convincingly  translated  into  universal 
substantial entitlements to welfare goods such as housing?   
 
There  is  also  the  closely  related,  but  distinct,  point  that  rights  can  conflict 
(Waldron, 1993), and the more expansive they are, the greater the likelihood of a 
clash; hence the rather modest focus on 'minimal justice' (Nussbaum, 2011a) in 
many rights discourses. Acknowledgment of this point means that some writers 
sympathetic to human rights, notably Sen and Waldron, view them in less than 
absolutist  terms,  but  rather  as  part  of  a  system  of  social  goals  that  may 
sometimes have to be traded-off or balanced against each other – albeit in a 
context of utmost respect for the individual, rather than an overriding interest in 
aggregative social welfare. Even Nussbaum, while insisting that both capabilities 
and rights are 'trumps', in the sense that they have a very strong priority over the 
pursuit of welfare generally, acknowledges that there may sometimes have to be 
'tragic'  choices  made  which  inevitably  violate  rights  (2011a,  p.  34). 
Notwithstanding these nuances, there is a strong thread of uncompromising – yet 
unrealisable  –  moral  absolutism  in  much  rights  talk  (Waldron,  2003),  which 
Ignatieff for one argues is inimical to open debate: 15 
 
 
Activists  who  suppose  that  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  is  a 
comprehensive list of all the desirable ends of human life fail to understand that 
these  ends  –  liberty  and  equality,  freedom  and  security,  private  property  and 
distributive justice – conflict and, because they do, the rights that define them as 
entitlements are also in conflict ... The idea of rights as trumps implies that when 
rights  are  introduced  into  a  political  discussion,  they  serve  to  resolve  the 
discussion. In fact, the opposite is the case. When political demands are turned 
into  rights  claims,  there  is  a  real  risk  that  the  issue  at  stake  will  become 
irreconcilable, since calling a claim a right is to call it non-negotiable, at least in 
popular parlance.  
(Ignatieff, 2000, pp. 299–300). 
 
From a philosophical perspective, this challenge to the coherence of absolutist 
human rights can be traced back to the concept of value pluralism, most closely 
associated with Isaiah Berlin: 
  
... the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible 
with  each  other,  the  possibility  of  conflict  –  and  of  tragedy  –  can  never 
wholly  be  eliminated  from  human  life,  either  personal  or  social.  The 
necessity  of  choosing  between  absolute  claims  is  then  an  inescapable 
characteristic of the human condition.  
(Berlin, 1969, p. 214) 
 
Conflicts between values of this kind are evident in the housing policy sphere, 
with – for instance – social housing allocations seeking to fulfil the competing 
objectives of meeting housing need, rewarding desert, accommodating individual 
freedom of choice,   and sustaining „balanced‟ communities. While some such 
trade-offs may be eased in a context of plentiful resources (e.g. a large, evenly 
dispersed stock of social housing, which suffers no sharp gradient in housing 
quality or neighbourhood desirability). These conditions are rarely experienced in 
practice (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 1999). Thus, whatever compromise is struck 
between  competing  housing  policy  objectives,  the  distributive  outcome  can 
almost always be viewed as violating someone‟s absolute „right‟ to a standard of 
housing that meets both their physical and social needs.   
 
The second common critique of human rights concerns their lack of enforceability 
within  current  institutional  contexts.  Scruton  (2006)  powerfully  articulates  this 
objection, from what is clearly a legal positivist stance:  
 
Rights do not come into existence merely because they are declared. They 
come into existence because they can be enforced. They can be enforced 
only where there is a rule of law … Outside the nation state those conditions 
have never arisen in modern times … When embedded in the law of nation 
states,  therefore,  rights  become  realities;  when  declared  by  transnational 
committees they remain in the realm of dreams – or, if you prefer Bentham‟s 
expression „nonsense on stilts‟.  
(Scruton, 2006, pp. 20–21) 16 
 
 
Arguing from a very different perspective, Arendt (1973), writing after two world 
wars which had killed and displaced millions of people, exposed the limits and 
„hopeless idealism‟ (p. 269) of the human rights discourse, and in particular:  
 
...  the  discrepancy  between  the  efforts  of  well-meaning  idealists  who 
stubbornly insist on regarding as „inalienable‟ those human rights, which are 
enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilised countries, and 
the situation of the rightless themselves.  
(Arendt, 1973, p. 279)  
 
Against  this,  there  are  those  who  argue  that  the  fulfilment  of  rights  must  be 
distinguished from the matter of their existence, and that to insist otherwise is to 
maintain too rigid a link between rights and the 'perfect' (i.e. exact and strict) 
duties of particular agents (UNDP, 2000). In this view, human rights are better 
understood as general moral claims against society as a whole, with the Kantian 
notion of 'imperfect duties' reflected in Waldron's (1993, p. 23) conceptualisation 
of rights as “held by each individual against the whole world‟. Rights advocates 
would, of course, nonetheless like to see progress towards the fulfilment of these 
imperfect duties, and Kenna (2005), writing specifically about rights to housing, 
focuses on the ways in which the gap between rhetoric and reality on human 
rights could be narrowed through better systems of international governance and 
accountability  in  order  to  realise  enforceable  human  rights  beyond  the 
boundaries of the nation state. According to Kenna, those committed to helping 
homeless  people  need  to  focus  efforts  on  ensuring  that  „the  human  rights 
obligations accepted by States at international level are vindicated at national, 
regional and local level‟ (p. 29).  
 
However,  this  emphasis on  improved  enforceability  brings  us  to  the  third  key 
objection to human rights approaches to tackling social issues like housing need 
and  homelessness.  The  „rights‟  expressed  in  international  instruments  are, 
inevitably,  broad  and  abstract  in  nature  rather  than  detailed,  delimited  and 
contextualised.  They  are  thus  quite  different  in  nature  to  the  'democratically 
endorsed  legislation'  discussed  in  the  section  above  in  relation  to  rights  to 
housing in the UK and France. Indeed, it is worth emphasising in this regard that 
the Scottish reforms establishing legal rights to housing for virtually all homeless 
people referred to above emerged from a domestic consensus between political 
elites  and  those  working  in  the  homelessness  sector  concerning  how  best  to 
improve responses to homelessness, and owed nothing to international human 
rights law and discourses.  
 
If the abstract rights as expressed in international instruments – as opposed to 
the detailed entitlements articulated in domestic legislation - were in fact to be 
rendered routinely enforceable via courts (international or domestic) this would 
amount to a major transfer of policy-making power from the political to the legal 
sphere. Particularly in the case of material rights such as the right to housing, the 
granting of wide-ranging policy discretion to the courts implies (unelected) judges 17 
 
determining the allocation of scarce resources in situations where „hard choices‟ 
have to be made between a range of needy and/or deserving cases (see also 
King, 2003). The term „over-socialisation‟ has been used to describe the situation 
wherein courts are inappropriately used to decide such 'polycentric' policy issues 
(Dean,  2002),  and  there  are  obvious  constitutional  and  democratic  concerns 
about judges rather than politicians setting broad policy aims and priorities. As 
some prominent legal scholars have recently commented about 'human rights 
juristocracy',  i.e.  circumstances  wherein  the  'constitutionalisation' of  rights  has 
transferred  significant  amounts  of  power  from  representative  institutions  to 
judiciaries (cf. Hirschl, 2007). 
 
[this] feeds the unfortunate assumption that if human rights are at issue then we 
have a matter that should be de-politicised and therefore de-democratised to the 
point where we look to courts rather than parliaments to solve our major political 
problems ... [while] human rights enthusiasts castigate human rights sceptics for 
being  naive  about  real  world  twenty-first  century  democracy  ...  human  rights 
sceptics  attribute  even  greater  naivety  to  those  who  see  courts  as  democratic 
substitutes.  
(Campbell et al., 2011, p. 10) 
 
In spite of these weaknesses, human rights discourses retain a key strength. 
'The articulation of imperfect duties' (UNDP, 2000, p. 26) encompassed in the 
human  rights  framework  has  been  argued  to  constitute a  discursive  resource 
(Dean,  2009,  p9),  with  „rhetorical  and  agitprop  merits  …  when  it  comes  to 
exposition  or  to  „consciousness  raising‟  (UNDP,  2000,  p.  24).  From  this 
perspective, human rights are „political instruments to mobilize dissent, protest, 
opposition and collective action aimed at social and economic reform‟ (Fortman, 
2006, p. 38; see also Waldron, 1993). Furthermore, as Isaac (2002) notes, it is 
irresponsible to simply deconstruct and expose the weaknesses of the human 
rights discourse without proposing alternative, superior ways of pursuing social 
justice  or  at  least  humanitarian  goals  on  a  global  basis  (Miller,  1999).  Even 
Ignatieff – a sceptic of the human rights discourse in other regards (see quote 
above) – sees human rights as a valuable „shared vocabulary‟ (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 
349),  and  it  is  a  vocabulary  that  is  extensively  drawn  upon  by  organisations 
representing those in housing need (FEANTSA, 2008). 
 
So,  for  all  their  philosophical  and  practical  limitations,  human  rights  may  be 
considered a „useful fiction‟, justified, perhaps ironically, on the consequentialist 
basis  that  they  do  more  good  than  harm,  especially  in  countries  where 
democratic  traditions  and  the  protection  of  minorities  remain  weak  or 
underdeveloped. Such a stance, it could be noted, is very much in keeping with 
the  'outcome-orientated'  approach  of  Nussbaum  (2011a),  and  the  'broad 
consequentialism' of Sen (2006).  
 
Concluding discussion 
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This article has attempted to untangle the complexity of the concept of „rights‟ 
within the field of shelter, housing and homelessness. It commenced by drawing 
out some key distinctions within the philosophical discourse on rights, focusing in 
particular on the division between natural rights and socially constructed rights, 
suggesting  that  something  of  a  „third  way‟  can  be  found  in  the  „universal 
constructivism‟  (or  „moderate  essentialism‟)  of  Nussbaum‟s  central  human 
capabilities  approach,  that  may  in  turn  provide  a  philosophically  defensible 
foundation for human rights in the housing field. It proposed „citizenship‟ as a 
conceptual bridge between the philosophical discourse on rights, and its practical 
application  within  particular  institutional  and  political  contexts  at  national  or 
international  level.  We  translated  Marshall‟s  classic,  though  somewhat 
ambiguous, division between „civil‟ and „social‟ citizenship rights into a distinction 
between „legal rights‟ to housing (individuals‟ formal rights to a dwelling of certain 
standard) and „programmatic rights' to housing (what general housing standard 
members of certain society can legitimately expect).  
 
It may reasonably be argued, to borrow a legal metaphor, that the „jury is still out‟ 
on the relative benefits and disbenefits of enforceable legal rights to housing at 
national  level.  However,  a  recent  comparative  study  by  one  of  the  authors 
provides some support for a positive interpretation of the potential of enforceable 
rights in this field, demonstrating that the Scottish (strongly legal rights-based) 
model not only succeeds in prioritising the housing needs of single homeless 
men (by crowding out provider discretion), but also has psycho-social impacts, 
helping to combat the stigma of homelessness (by countering 'status loss') and 
„empowering‟ homeless people in their interactions with service providers. 
 
At the international level, key criticisms of human rights to housing (and other 
material  goods)  focus  on  their  contested  normative  value  and  coherence  and 
their  lacking  enforceability,  and  also  the  extent  to  which  such,  necessarily 
abstract, rights may imply a major and inappropriate transfer of policy-making 
discretion  from  the  political  to  the  legal  sphere.  At  the  same  time,  there  is a 
credible  argument  that,  whatever  their  shortcomings,  the  discourse  of 
international  human  rights  may  do  more  good  than  harm,  especially  in  the 
absence of an alternative model for pursuing global social justice.  
 
A key purpose of this article has been to highlight the complexity of the concept 
of rights as applied in the housing and social policy field, and the importance of 
clarity  when  engaging  in  any  form  of  'rights  talk'.  In  particular,  we  sought  to 
demonstrate that it is perfectly possible to object to natural and/or human rights 
in the housing field, on either philosophical or pragmatic grounds or both, and still 
be in favour of clearly delimited legal rights to housing within specific domestic 
legal  systems.  Conversely,  one  may  be  in  sympathy  with  the  discourse  of 
universal human rights, but be sceptical with respect to the alleged juridification 
and atomisation associated with individually enforceable legal rights. For those 
who  seek  to  establish  a  firm  foundation  for  a  „human  right‟  to  housing,  we 
commend Martha Nussbaum‟s „central human capabilities‟ approach as providing 19 
 
a promising starting point for taking this debate forward to the next stage, both 
politically and philosophically. 
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